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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. SEAL, 
Plaintiff, 
-~ 
ALMA E. POWELL and 
MARGARET E POWELL, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9044 
On December 4, 1957, the defendants executed a docu-
ment at Salt Lake City, Utah, offering to pay Union In-
terchange, Inc., a foreign corporation with principal offices 
at Los Angeles, California, the sum of $1,350.00 for cer-
tain advertising services three months after defendants' 
advertisement for the sale of a motel for $105,000.00 was 
completed and sent to real estate brokers and potential buy-
ers throughout the nation. This offer was accepted by the 
Union Interchange, Inc., at Los Angeles, California, on 
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December 9, 1957. Plaintiff contends that a valid con-
tract existed between defendants and the Union Inter-
change, Inc., and that the latter fully performed said agree-
ment. Defendants did not pay anything on the advertising 
agreement referred to, and plaintiff as assignee of Union 
Interchange, Inc. brought this action for breach of contract. 
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that 
no action could be maintained for the services in question 
because the party rendering said servic~ was not licensed 
to act as a real estate broker pursuant to provisions of 
Sees. 61-2-1, 61--2-2, and 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953. The Stat~ 
of Utah through its Attorney General filed an amicus 
curiae brief in the matter which cited only the provisions 
of our statutes just mentioned. Defendant's motion was 
argued on December 23, 1958, pursuant to a stipulation 
filed vvith the lower court at that time which set forth the 
pertinent facts upon which defendants' Motion Dismiss 
was based (R 10, 11). On April 14, 1959, the Honorable 
Martin M. Larson made and entered an order granting 
defendants' motion and dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from that order. 
As set forth in the stipulation, plaintiff's assignor pub· 
lishes two publications in which advertisements are carried 
and their business consists of advertising businesses and in-
come property on a national basis. The contracts are per-
formed by advertising the sales information and distributing 
it nationally in Union's two publication which are published 
in Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff contends that no 
real estate broker's license is required to engage in such 
activities. Defendants claim that such activity is unlawful 
without such a license. To obtain the license in question 
the party seeking the same must, among other things, (!) 
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furnish a $1,000.00 bond conditioned on conducting his 
business in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title 61, U.C.A. 
1953, (2) furnish character references of Utah property 
owners who have know him for at least three years, (3) 
pass an examination on subjects related to real property 
transactions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ACTIVITIES OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR 
DO NOT COME WITHIN THE MEANING OF A 
"REAL15TATE. BROKER" WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF SEC. 61-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, AND CONSEQUENTLY 
SECTIONS 61-2-1 AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THE CONTRACT ::N QUESTION. 
POINT II 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, IM-
POSE AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON INTER-
STATE COMMERCE AS APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF'S 
A,SSIGNOR AND ARE THEREFORE TO THAT EX-
TENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
POINT III 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION TO THE EXTENT THEY RE-
QUIRE PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR TO OBTAIN A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
POINT IV 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, VIO-
LATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AND ARE THEREFORE UNCON-
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STITUTIONA'L TO THE EXTENT THEY REQUIRE 
PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR TO OBTAIN A REAL 
ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE UNDER THE. CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIVITIES OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR 
DO NOT COME WITHIN THE MEANING OF A 
"REAL ESTATE BROKER" WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF SEC. 61-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, AND CONSEQUENTLY 
SECTIONS 61-2-1 AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION. 
This court has previously considered the proper scope 
of the provisions of Sec. 61-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, in the case of 
Anderson v. JohlJSOlJ, (1945) 108 U 417, 160 Pac(2d) 725, 
in holding that one who assisted a real estate broker in ob· 
taining the listing of a farm was not a real estate broker 
or a real estate salesman within the meaning of said sec-
tion and failure by him to obtain such a license did not 
bar his recovery on an agreement with the real estate broker 
to pay him for such assistance. The concurring opinion in 
that case pointed out that to take this section literally would 
cover anyone who was in any way connected with a trans-
action involving real estate, such as the abstractor or a 
stenographer in the real estate office. It was there stated: 
"A reading of the statutes regulating real es-
tate brokers makes it apparent they were enacted for 
th benefit of the public to protect them from dis-
honest and unscrupulous real estate agents. Such 
protection of the public is not needed from the 
casual or remote influence of a stenographer or of 
a person who introduces a real estate broker to one 
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who may wish to deal with him. Neither the sten-
ographer nor the man who introduces the broker 
in the examples I have mentioned are active parti-
cipants in any contract affecting real estate or any 
liability of the persons entering into such contracts 
or listings. The dealings which the statutes aim to 
protect the public in are those which result in legal 
liabilities between the parties. Nothing the steno-
grapher or the man who introduces thf real estate 
broker does has that effect. This is true even though 
the real estate broker contracts to pay the man who 
introduces him a part of his commission in the 
event he makes a sale." 
In the case of MattheWs-Felton, Inc. v. LeBlanc (1930) 
13 L.A. APP 596, 126 SO 449, it was held that one who 
assists a licensed broker to procure an offer to purchase 
the property of another does not thereby become a real 
estate broker so as to be prevented from !;~Overing prom-
ised compensation. 
If one who personally introduces a prospect to a brok-
er is not required to obtain a license of the type in ques-
tion, afortori one ought not to need such a license to m.akc 
an introduction through printed advertisements mailed to 
brokers and prospective purchasers. 
Although the wording of our statute 15 broader than 
the comparable statute of the State of Wisconsin, appellant 
believes that the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in the case of Howard v. Heinig, 191 Wise. 166, 210 
NW 414, should be applied to this case. There the court 
held that one who is hired on a corrunission basis to put 
on a sales campaign and arrange for advertising of real 
estate was not required to have a broker's license since 
he was not engaged in negotiating any actual sales. The 
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case of Black Forest Realty & Investment Co. v. Clarke 
(1929) 86 Colo 454, 282 P 878, is to the same effect. The 
agreement in question here required plaintiff's assignor 
only to disseminate information which would tend to in-
terest prospective buyers in business property of its cus-
tomers and acquaint them with an opportunity to negotiate 
for the purchase of such property. Plaintiff's assignor did 
not agree to, nor did it, enter into any negotiation in any 
manner between these prospective sellers or any others and 
parties indicating an interest in purchasing the same. 
An annotation on the question "Who is a real estate 
agent, salesman, or broker within the meaning of license 
statutes?" is found in 56 A.L.R. 540 and supplemented in 
167 A.L.R. 774. None of tte cases discussed there, however, 
are too helpful on the point in issue, and appellant believes 
that this is so because plaintiff's assignor was engaged 
solely in the advertising and publishing business which 
is separate and distinct from the real estate business. 
It is evident that the word "advertise" as used in Sec. 
61-2-1, U.C.A. 1953, does not refer to advertising as a busi-
ness but is limited to advertising that one is acting as a 
real estate broker or salesman. The word "advertise" is 
also used twice in Sec. 61-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. There it is 
first used with respect to advertising options on real es-
tate or improvements thereon, which is not applicable in 
our case since no options on defendants' real estate or im-
provements were advertised in the case at bar. The secoml 
usage there is the same as that of the preceding section. 
Otherwise, appellant's assignor can only be brought with-
in the provisions of that section by means of the words 
"or assists or directs in the procuring of contracts ... 
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calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing, or rent-
ing of any real estate." As noted above in the Anderson 
case, it was not the legislative intent that this should 
be applied literally, and since this is so and appellant's as· 
signor was even further removed than the plaintiff in that 
case, the sections of our statute in question ought not to 
be applicable to this case. 
POINT II 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-16, U.C.A. 1953. IM-
POSE AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON INTER-
STATE COMMERCE AS APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF'S 
ASSIGNOR AND ARE THEREFORE TO THAT EX-
TENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In the case of State of Utah v. Salt Lake Tribune Pub· 
lishing Company, 66 U 187,249 Pac 474, this court held that 
it was unconstitutional for a state to prohibit the publica-
tion of advertisements for the sale of cigarettes and re-
lated products in a newspaper circulated in interstate com· 
merce where the sale of such products in the state of pub-
lication is restricted but not prohibited. There this court 
said: 
"If it is lawful. therefore, to deal in and to 
sell cigarettes, why i~ it not lawful to inform 
those "Nho may legally purchase an article where 
they may do so? It may be true that the state with-
in its police power may, as a matter of regula-
tion, seek to minimi>:e the sale of an article, the use 
of which it may deem injurious to the public health; 
and if it may do that, it may, perhaps, regulate or 
prohibit the advertisement of such an article. Where, 
however, as is the case here, the article in question 
is an article of commerce which is protected by the 
interstate commerce clause of the federal Canst-
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tution, it may weli be doubted whether the state 
can interfere with the sale of an article which is 
so protected. The conclusion, therefore, seems ir-
resistible that, in view that the advertisement pub-
lished by the Salt Lake Tribune in and of itself 
constitutes interstate commerce and where the State 
of Utah could not interfere, and further that the 
article likewise was protected both by the laws of 
Utah permitting its sale and to the extent that 
the article was shipped into the state in original 
packages was also protected from interference by 
the state, the defendant was clearly within its legal 
rights in publishing the advertisement, and that the 
statute in question constitutes an undue interference 
with interstate commerce and therefore cannot be 
upheld." 
There the following quotation from Post Printing and 
Publishing Co. v. Brewster (DC) 245 Fed. 321, was cited 
with approval: 
"The sale of cigarettes m the State of Missouri~ 
wh.;:~e the .new_spape.-s of plaintiff are P,ublished1 i• · ~~FVI.. DtS:iur;s;s t¢.0 Til"~>- n<!A-J.l!t.·~l:$\i"·f.'.i 8"1" -~~ /!J",r:,-~£ the intelligence where and on wbal tei'ms c•g<l- ~ 
rettes may be purchased by its subscribers. by way 
of advertisements inserted in such newspaper, is 
perfectly legitimate and proper. Further, it must be 
regarded as settled that sale of cigarettes in a for-
eign state to a citizen of this state, and their carriage 
from said foreign state into this state and here de-
livered in original packages in consummation of such 
sale made in a foreign state is legitimate interstate 
commerce, which is beyond the power of the Legisla-
lature of this state to prohibit or unduly restrict or 
burden (citing cases). In other words, while the busi" 
ness of bartering, selling, or in any other manner 
disposing of cigarettes in this state, or the business 
of advertising in any manner by any one within 
this state of the business of selling or disposing of 
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• 
cigarettes, is by the act in question properly pro-
hibited, yet by reason of the exclusive control of 
Congress over interstate commerce it must, I think, 
be held, as the conduct of interstate commerce in 
cigarettes may not by a state be prohibited or un-
reasonably burdened, it follows, of necessity, the 
business of advertising such interstate commerce 
business, which advertising itself not only is a form 
of interstate commerce, but further adheres in the 
very conduct of the interstate cigarette business 
itself, is also beyond the power of the state to pro-
hibit or make criminal and punish, and ~his for the 
reasotl it can not be thought possible to make the 
advertisement of a lawful business unlawful and 
punishable a3 a crime (citing cases)." 
The Utah case last referred to was the subject of an 
annotation on the question "Statute or ordinance in rela-
tion to advertising as interference with interstate com-
merce" in 48 A.L.R. 563, which has been further supple-
mented in 57 A.L.R. 105, and 115 A.L.R. 952. The principles 
there enunciated are belie.ved to support this appeal. In 
48 A.L.R. 563, the conclusion is summarized thusly: 
"The general principle as formulated in 5 R.C.L. 
703 is that the state or municipality may, in the ex-
en:ise of its po;ice power, enact s~atutes and ordin-
ances to protect the public health, morals, or safe-
ty, and public convenience, provided they are local 
in their character and affect interstate commerce 
incidentally only." 
The Salt Lake Tribune case has been cited favorably 
or distinguished in ali of the ca5es which have cited it sub-
sequently. It furnished important authority for the holding 
in Little v. Smith, 257 P 962 (Kan) which held that their 
statute prohibiting the advertising of cigarettes and cigar-
10 
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ette papers m any newspaper or periodical published in 
Kansas is an undue interference with interstate commerce 
and otherwise violated the federal constitution and wa3 
therefore void. 
It can not be contended that the sale of real property 
•s not a lawful business and while such activity is not pro-
tected under the interstate commerce clause, it is not an 
activity that can be constitutionally prohibited and cer-
tainly is lawful in any event under our law. Since the 
activity itself is lawful and constitutionally protected, it 
must follow under the reasoning of the above authorities 
that the advertisement can not be constitutionally pro-
hibited or unreasonably burdened. The sections in ques-
tion would if lawfully applicable to appellant's assignor 
require its solicitors to (1) furnish $1,000.00 bond condi-
tioned on the solicitor conducting his business in accord-
ance with the requirements of Chapter 2 of Title 61, U.C.A. 
1953, (2) furnish letters of recommendation from three 
citizens owning real property here who have known such 
parties for three years, (3) sucessfully pass examinations 
in English, arithmetic, bookkeeping, real estate principles 
and practice, including the elements of land economics, real 
estate law, acquisition of titles, deeds, leases, mortgages, 
land contracts, agency contracts, liens, zoing, taxation, and 
the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 61, U.C.A. 1953. Such 
requirements are, for the mo~t part, wholiy unrelated to the 
lawful business in which appellant's assignor is engaged. 
That such requirements would be an unreasonable burden 
on the commerce in which Union Interchange, Inc. is en-
gaged can hardly be questioned. 
11 
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POINT III 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION TO THE EXTENT THAT 
THEY REQUIRE PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR TO OB-
TAIN A REAL ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
In the case of United Interchange, I!i.c. v. Spellacy, 
144 Conn 647, 136 A 2(d) 801, the Supreme Court of Con· 
necticut declared unconstitutional a statute designed speci-
fically to require real estate licenses for the type of ac-
tivity involved in this case. The plaintiff there was a pub-
lisher's representative in certain eastern states in a similar 
capacity to Union Interchange in certain western state~ 
and the facts are substantially identical to the instant 
case. There the court had this to say on the point in issue· 
"We shall conside,- first the argument advanced 
with regard to due process and equal proteetion of 
the laws. SuccGssfully to pass the test of constitu-
tional validity in these respects, the act as amended 
to embrace these plaintiffs must be a proper exel"-
cise of the po:ice power of the state. We have re-
cently examined the basic pdndples applicable to 
police legislation regulating the conduct of busi-
ness and professional activity. State v. Gordon, 143 
Conn. 698, 705, 125 A.2d 477; Calve Bros. Co. v. Nor-
wald. 143 Conn. 609, 612, 124 A. 2d 881; Cyphers v. 
Allyn, supra, 705; Amsel v. Brooks, 414 Conn. 288, 
289, 106 A. 2d 152. The test is whether (1) some 
need for serving the public health, safety, or gen-
eral welfare makes the regulatory legislation neces-
sary or desirable, and (2) whether the legislation 
serves that need in a way which is not arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, and confiscatory to an unreasonable 
12 
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and unnecessary degree. In passing upon the need 
and in fashioning the method of serving it, the legis-
lature under its police powers has a broad discretion. 
The limitation upon this discretioin is drawn by 
the courts at that point where the regulatory meas-
ures fail to serve the public good, or serve it in a 
despotic way. 
"The 1955 amendment prevents the plaintiffs 
from carrying on a lawful business unless they ob-
tain real estate brokers' and salesmen's licenses. This 
is done by defining the activities of the plaintiffs 
a, 'engaging in the real estate business' and requir-
ing of them brokers' and salesmen's licenses in or-
der to continue their activities. It is true that legis-
latures may define the tenns used in their enact-
ments and that courts are bound to accept their 
definitions. Firs! Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Connelly, 142 Conn. 483, 489, 115 A. 2d 455, and 
cases cited. This rule extends only to the meaning 
to be given by the courts to the terms defined. It 
does not prevent the courts from examining the 
definition to see whether it logically and fairly de-
scribes the purported object of the definition. 
"United's business is primarily advertising. It 
differs from newspaper and magazine publishers 
generally in the respect only that it limits the 
range of its advertising activities to specific types 
of property. Its purposes are to bring to the atten-
tion of prospective purchases propeties available for 
purchase and to the attention of pospective sellers 
buyers who are looking for particular kinds of prop-
erties. These are the fundamental purposes of all 
sales advertising. United's salesmen secure written 
contracts from property sellers or buyers to adver-
tise in its publications. These salesmen assist in 
the preparation of these advertisements. The con-
tracts and the advertisements are then submitted to 
United and thereafter published in 'Buyers Digest' 
and 'Brokers Bulletin.' It does not appear, however, 
that these salesmen advise as to price and for that 
13 
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reason should have some knowledge of real estate 
values, nor that they direct or assist in the nego-
tiations between the interested parties and so must 
know something about real estate incumbrances, 
taxes, zoning, and other regulations, and other sim-
ilar factors involved in a real estate deal. Why then 
should the officers of United and its salesmen be 
required to take a written examination to estab-
lish their competency to carry on the real estate 
business with all of the detail which that in-
volves? The terms of payment prescribed by Unit-
ed are such that its salesmen have no occasion to 
handle its customers' funds. Why then should its 
salesmen be required, in order to carry on its busi-
ness, to post surety company bonds in substantial 
amounts, renewable annually? 
"The only reason advanced for the need and 
design of this amendment is to prevent fraud, a 
purpose which has always been considered legiti-
mate for the exercise of the police power when 
the facts warranted it. Walp v. Mooa.r, 76 Conn. 515, 
521, 57 A. 277; State v. Feingold, 77 Conn. 326, 333, 
59 A. 211. A legitimate purpose, however, cannot 
justify an unreasonable and unnecessarily arbitrary 
and discriminatory method of accomplishing it. 
"The legislative power to regulate a business 
fraught with particular danger to the public is much 
wider than in the case of an ordinary lawful busi-
ness such as advertising. 'In the one business no 
citizen has an absolute right to engage; in the other 
all citizens have a right and an equal right to en-
gage. The difference is vital.' State v. Conlon, 65 
Conn. 478, 486, 33 A 519; State v. Porter, 94 Conn. 
639, 643, 110 A. 59; 30 Am. jLlr. 278, 40. Where 
the business is a lawful one and involves no parti-
cular danger to the public, 'the regulation must not 
be unreasonably in excess of what is necessary to 
accomplish the supposed end; and in the case of 
a business in which all citizens have a right and 
an equal right to engage, the principle of equality 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of rights must, in this State, be observed.' State v. 
Po,rter, supra, 645. This is not to imply that ac-
tivities such as the plaintiffs carry on cannot, con-
sistently with constitutional limitations, be regu-
lated. That is nat the issue in this case. Rather, 
the question for decision is whether this particular 
legislation is consistent with those limitations. 
"The amendment purports to describe the busi-
ness of the plaintiffs as promoting 'the sale of real 
estate through the listing of ... property in a pub-
lication issued primarily for such purpose or for 
referral of information concerning properties to li-
censed real estate brokers or both.' Cum. Sup. 1955, 
& 2339d (c). The finding discloses that this is in 
h.ct a fair description of what the plaintiffs pur-
port to do. That being so, there is no sound rea-
son for requiring them to take a written examina-
tion on their competency as real estate brokers 
and salesmen, to furnish a corporate surety bond 
and to pay substantial fees for the original is-
suance of their licenses and for the annual renewal 
thereof. Such requirements are unnecessarily bur-
densome and discriminatory. 
"The view which we have taken makes it un-
necessary to consider the plaintiffs' claim that the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press 
was violated. 
"We hold that the provisions of 2339d which 
embrace the plaintiffs' activities within the defini-
tion of what constitutes 'engaging in the real es-
tate business' and the activities of a 'real estate 
broker' or a 'real estate salesman' violate the con-
stitutional rights of the plaintiffs and are null 
and void." 
POINT IV 
SECS. 61-2-l, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, VIO-
LATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AND ARE THEREFORE UNCON-
STITUTIONAL TO THE EXTENT THEY REQUIRE 
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PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR TO OBTAIN A REAL ES-
TATE BROOKER'S LICENSE UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE. 
The Supreme Court of Main in the case of United In-
terchange, Inc . .of Mass. v. Harding, 154 Mo 179, 145 A 
2(d} 94, after citing the case of United Interchange L 
Spellacy, supra, said: 
"The Connecticut court rested its decision en-
tirely upon the improper exercise of the police pow-
er and deemed it unnecessary to disct.:ss the pos-
sible invasion of freedom of the press although it 
recogni>!ed the issue. We might properly do the 
same but are prompted to ccrmnent on this issue 
because of the far reaching consequences of any 
encroachment on tha~ freedom. Since the adver-
tising activities of the daily newspaper and the 
family magazine differ from those of the petition-
ers only in the fact that the advertising accepted 
by the latter is restricted to the field of income 
producing real estate, the decision in the instant 
case is of vital concern to the whole press. The 
protection of the freedom of the press is intended 
primarily to safeguard the public in i·:~. right to 
the circulation of information. This freedom is 
protected within this state by the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and 
by the Constitution of Maine. The latter document 
is specific a"d concise in this respect. Art. 1, Sec. 
4 provides in pa~t: ' ... no laws shall be passed re.g-
ulating or restraining the freedom oC the press.' 
Historically, the struggle for the freedom of the 
press was primarily directed against tl•e power of 
the licensor and was addressed to obtaining liberty 
to publish 'without a license what formefly could 
be published only with one.' Lovell v. City of Grif. 
fin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S Ct. 666. The liberty of the 
press is not of course license to libel or to print 
the scandalous or the immoral. Rather does the 
freedom relate to 'previ.ous restraints' before pub-
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lication as well as to protection from penalities for 
publishing what is harmless to the public welfare. 
The meaning of and recogni:zed exceptions to these 
basic rules are reviewed in Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 530. Efforts to undermine 
this freedom by the device of requiring license or 
imposing a discriminatory tax have been steadfast-
ly resisted. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444. The evidence discloses that 
petitioners ~upported by advertising sales, publish 
and circulate a magazine which contains information, 
opinion, and advertising. We are not here concerned 
with any abuse of liberty. No one would seriously 
contend that the publication of advertisements for 
the sale of real estate is a proper subject for any 
'previous restraint.' The press can be deprived of 
its liberty as quickly by previous restraints which 
destroy its sources of revenue as by a rigid cen-
sorship. If by an artificial licensing device, the 
business of these petitioners can be curtailed or 
terminated, we see no obstacle to further encroach-
ment on freedom of the press by restrictive legis-
lative device aimed at specific media or even at the 
whole industry. As was said in Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., supra, at page 449 (of 56 S. Ct.) ... 
'and since informed public opinion is the most po-
tent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the sup-
pression or abridgment of the publicity afforded 
by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than 
with grave concern ... To allow it to be fettered 
is to fetter ourselves.' We cannot sanction any 
breach in the wall of protection. 
'"For these reasons so much of R. S. 1954, Cb. 
84 as was enacted by the amendment contained in 
P. L. 1957 Cit. 32, must be held unconstitutional and 
null and void as applied to the activities of these 
petitioners." 
In that case the statute in question was directly aimed 
at the type of activity involved in this case and was, there-
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fore, like the one involved in the Connecticut case and 
not like the one involved in this case. To the extent, how· 
ver, that this court might find that appellant's assignor 
was required to obtain a license under the provisions of 
the Utah statutes in question, that case would, if followed, 
require the holding that those statutes as applied to such 
a party are unconstitutional as violating the freedom of 
press as well as the equal protection and due proce~s and 
conunerce clauses of the federal Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The activities of plaintiff's assignor do not come with· 
in the provision of our real estate licensing statutes; con-
sequently no such license was required to lawfully seek 
compensation for the services in this case. Accordingly, 
the order of dismissal should be vacated and the case re-
manded to the District Court of Salt Lake County for 
further proceedings. 
If it is held that the activities of plaintiff's assignor 
were such that the statutes in question required a broker'~ 
license in order to recover for the services of appellant's 
assignor, to that extent said statutes in question are void 
as they conflict with the commerce clause, the due process 
clause, the equal protection clause, and the first amend-
ment of the federal Constitution. The order of dismissal 
based thereon was, therefore, in error and should be va· 
cated and the case remanded to the District Court of Salt 
Lake County for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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